Nietzsche\u27s Graffito: A Reading of \u3cem\u3eThe Antichrist\u3c/em\u3e by Shapiro, Gary
University of Richmond
UR Scholarship Repository
Philosophy Faculty Publications Philosophy
Spring 1981
Nietzsche's Graffito: A Reading of The Antichrist
Gary Shapiro
University of Richmond, gshapiro@richmond.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/philosophy-faculty-
publications
Part of the History of Philosophy Commons, and the Metaphysics Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Philosophy at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Philosophy
Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
Recommended Citation
Shapiro, Gary. "Nietzsche's Graffito: A Reading of The Antichrist." Boundary 2 9, no. 3 (Spring 1981): 119-40. doi:10.2307/303116.
Nietzsche's Graffito: A Reading of The Antichrist 
Gary Shapiro 
Even those writers who have good things to say about Nietzsche 
usually do not have good things to say abut his penultimate book, The 
Antichrist. Like Ecce Homo it is often described as at least prefiguring 
Nietzsche's madness if not (as is sometimes the case) said to be part of that 
desperate glide itself. Those inclined to reject the book may be encouraged 
in this view by Nietzsche's statement to Brandes, in November 1888, that 
The Antichrist is the whole of The Transvaluation of All Values (originally 
announced as a series of four books) and that Ecce Homo is its necessary 
prelude. The reader will have already discerned my intention of retrieving 
this exorbitant text for the Nietzschean canon. Such operations of 
retrieval are standard enough moves within a certain kind of philological 
discourse which privileges the book as an expressive or cognitive totality. 
But Nietzsche, the arch philologist, is today often regarded as not only 
undercutting the grounds of such moves by challenging their hermeneutic 
presuppositions but as having exemplified in a paradigmatic fashion the 
discontinuous, fragmentary or porous text. The second view of Nietzsche's 
writings is a very traditional one; it is a commonplace with Nietzsche's 
earlier readers to regard all of his writing as distressingly wanting in order 
and style, despite their admiration for his thought. Such has continued to 
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be the assumption of Anglo-American readers like Walter Kaufmann and 
Arthur Danto, who have aimed at articulating the internal order of 
Nietzsche's thought which the stylistic fireworks of the texts obscure. 
Recent French readers, most notably Jacques Derrida, have tried to show 
that fragmentation and undecidability are not merely secondary features 
of Nietzsche's writing but constitute its very element. Derrida 
outrageously suggests that the jotting "I forgot my umbrella" is typical of 
all Nietzsche's writing in its ambiguity and undecidability of meaning and 
in its systematic evasion of all contextual explication. One might wonder 
whether such a strategy of reading is indebted to Nietzsche's own 
hermeneutic strategy in The Antichrist. There Nietzsche anticipates 
Heidegger and Derrida by relying on the figure of erasure to designate his 
own relation to Christianity, its textual traditions, and its central figure, 
Jesus. Following the nineteenth century philological and historical 
methods to their extreme and thereby overturning and transvaluing 
(umkehren and umwerten) both the methods and Christianity, Nietzsche 
tries to restore the blank page which is Jesus' life to its pristine purity of 
white paper, tabula rasa. In this respect Nietzsche's project is very much 
like Robert Rauschenberg's erased De Kooning and like Derrida's attempt 
to shatter any determinate meaning in Nietzsche himself by revealing the 
irreducible plurality of woman in the apparent masculine ambitions of 
order and control in Nietzsche's style. All of these efforts nevertheless 
remain marked with the signatures of their authors; the negation of a 
negation cannot be negation itself. At the end there is Rauschenberg's art, 
Derrida's project of deconstruction, Nietzsche's graffito scrawled on the 
Christian text. This, however, is to anticipate the results of my project of 
retrieval. 
Just as erasure is always an act which leaves its own mark, so 
retrieval is possible but need not produce that totalizing organic unity 
which has been the constant phantom of aesthetic thought. If retrieval is 
always partial it is also easier because the excesses of Nietzsche's readers 
here have been egregious. Consider, for example, Eugen Fink's 
Heideggerean book on Nietzsche which contains only a brief analysis of 
The Antichrist, dismissing its philosophical value: 
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In the text The Antichrist (Attempt at a Critique of 
Christianity) Nietzsche battles against the Christian 
religion with an unparalleled fervor of hatred, and with a 
flood of invectives and accusations. Here the virtuosity 
of his attack, leaving no stone unturned, reverses itself. 
The lack of measure destroys the intended effect; one 
can't be convincing while foaming at the mouth. 
Essentially the text offers nothing new; Nietzsche 
collects what he has already said about the morality of 
pity and the psychology of the priest-but now he gives 




















